G. W. F. Hegel’s Understanding of the Absolute: A Non-metaphysical Interpretation

Abstract

G. W. F. Hegel is usually regarded as a/the metaphysician par excellence. However, his thought is multi-faceted and its overarching metaphysical scheme can be viewed as self-deconstructive and containing many elements that represent a non-metaphysical philosophical-epistemological stance. This paper will explore the possibilities of self-overcoming of Hegel’s metaphysics with reference to his understanding of the concept of the absolute as expounded in the Phenomenology of Spirit, especially the Preface. The paper is composed of two main sections from the ontological and epistemological perspectives respectively. The first section deals with Hegel’s groundbreaking understanding of the absolute within the philosophical context of his time, explicating his agreements and disagreements with Spinoza, Kant’s critical philosophy and the post-Kantian philosophy of identity, represented by Fichte and Schelling, and, above all, highlighting Hegel’s own innovations, coming to grips with the intricacies of his thought. The section argues for a trans-immanent (J.-L. Nancy’s neologism) conception of the absolute in the Phenomenology, which means an absolute, opening up from and remaining within the very limits of human reason and worldly immanence, generating itself ad infinitum within its own finite limits. The second section, in turn, suggests a non-metaphysical way of understanding the knowledge of the absolute proposed by Hegel. His epistemological polemics with the Romantics is also considered, after that, disclosing self-deconstructive elements in Hegel’s system, in fact offering a gallery of images of fake, perspectival, relative “absolutes”.